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Message from the Editors 
 
In 2008, the Naval War College established the Center on Irregular 
Warfare & Armed Groups (CIWAG). CIWAG’s primary mission is 
twofold: first, to bring cutting-edge research on Irregular Warfare into 
the Joint Professional Military Educational (JPME) curricula; and 
second, to bring operators, practitioners, and scholars together to share 
their knowledge and experiences about a vast array of violent and non-
violent irregular challenges. 
This CIWAG case study in one in a series examining the role 
of resource and water conflict in national/international security. A 
survey of news stories from across the globe show that from 2010–
2013 alone there were incidents of violence—large and small—
involving access to water in Yemen, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Indian, 
Kashmir, Brazil, Egypt, Nigeria, Uzbekistan, South Sudan, Mali, 
Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Tanzania, Syria, Libya, and Indonesia.  
The issue of access to and control of water becomes even more 
acute in states in which there is an ongoing conflict or in states that are 
trying to transition from conflict to stability. Although we most often 
think of water conflicts in terms of access to drinking water, the reality 
is that most water is needed for industrial and agricultural purposes; 
when rivers run dry, crops fail and communities face famine and 
starvation even in some of the world’s dampest places. Moreover, in 
some of these countries internal conflicts exacerbate the issue of who 
has access to water, and in others, state-to-state friction over dams and 
irrigation water has spilt over into armed clashes.  
In “Water Wars: The Brahmaputra River and Sino-Indian 
Relations,” Mr. Christopher focuses on one specific case of cross-
border tensions over water in order to develop a framework for 
examining security challenges related to water. Given the short length 
of the paper, the discussion focuses on just four of the many issues to 
be considered: international river governance norms, food security 
issues, water governance, and the key role of geography. Christopher 
has also set out some of the basic terminology and strategic issues that 
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make water shortages a national and international security challenge.  
The case study is intended to be a place to begin the 
conversation about the linkage between water and security, particularly 
in regions in the world where armed groups and irregular warfare are a 
daily reality. It should be noted, moreover, there is much more work to 
be done in exploring this issue. As a starting point, the bibliography 
gives a snapshot of the range of literature on water issues and specific 
conflicts in detail.  
It is important to note two critical caveats to this case study. 
First, the opinions found in this case study are solely those of the author 
and do not represent the views of the Department of Defense, the Naval 
War College, or CIWAG. Second, while every effort has been made to 
correct any factual errors in this work, the author is ultimately 
responsible for the content of this case study.  
We hope you find this case study useful, and look forward to 
hearing your feedback and suggestions for how you can contribute to 
the Center on Irregular Warfare & Armed Group’s mission here at the 
Naval War College. 
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The Brahmaputra River Basin
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http://www.indianetzone.com/29/brahmaputra_river_basin.htm 
 
CHRISTOPHER: WATER WARS 
 
10 
 
 
 
Asian River Linkages
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I. Introduction 
On February 27, 2012, the mighty Brahmaputra River, one of 
the largest in the world, ran dry. In the East Siang District of Arunachal 
Pradesh, a territory administered by India but claimed by China, people 
in the town of Pasighat reported that the usually strong river suddenly 
dwindled to almost nothing. The state’s Minister of Water Resources 
demanded an investigation into whether the shortage had been caused 
by dam building upstream on the Chinese-controlled portion of the 
river. “The panic of the people can't be brushed off,” he warned.3  
Water has the potential to be one of the great challenges of the 
twenty-first century. According to United Nations estimates, more than 
half the global population will live in water-stressed or water-scarce 
countries by 2025.
4
 The vast majority of these people will be in China 
and India. Changes resulting from continued economic growth and 
modernization in these countries—including an increase in irrigated 
farming, rising industrial production, expanding consumption in a 
growing middle class, and, particularly in China, raising animals for a 
more meat-centric diet—will place ever-greater pressure on water 
supplies. Macro challenges such as climate change and pollution will 
further strain freshwater resources. 
As China and India struggle to grow, provide for their citizens, 
and expand their respective roles as major players on the world stage, 
the two countries are increasingly facing water constraints. This 
challenge is made more complex by its shared nature: much of India’s 
river water originates in China. Of the rivers that cross the Sino-Indian 
border, the most important is the Brahmaputra. 
The Brahmaputra River flows for more than two thousand 
miles through China, India, and Bangladesh on its journey from the 
Himalayas to the Bay of Bengal. It is a source of life and livelihood for 
millions along its route. And its future is in question. China has 
                                                     
3
 “Brahmaputra Dries Up in Arunachal Pradesh town! Is China Responsible?,” 
Economic Times, March 1, 2012. 
4
 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Fact Sheet, 
International Decade for Action, “Water for Life,” 2005-2015, 
http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/scarcity.shtml. 
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embarked upon a series of dam-building and water-diversion projects 
that have the potential to significantly alter the river’s course and flow, 
raising the specter of severe harm to those downstream. Although 
China has thus far promised to keep its dam projects small and 
inconsequential, the river’s massive hydropower potential—particularly 
at the Brahmaputra’s Great Canyon, where the river drops thousands of 
feet through a mountainous stretch—may well prove too tempting for 
China’s planners to resist. Should they choose to press ahead with the 
construction of a large dam, India may face a stark choice: risk 
provoking Beijing’s anger, and possibly even provoke a military 
response, by opposing or trying to block construction, or allow dam 
building to proceed and give China the ability to choke off the flow of 
one of the India’s most important resources. 
This case study examines some of the international, regional, 
and local challenges that arise from friction over water resources, using 
as a case study the Brahmaputra River. Section II provides background 
information, including basic water usage data for China, India, and 
Bangladesh; an overview of the Brahmaputra River’s course and 
geography; and a history of China’s dam building and water diversion 
projects on the river to date. Section III explores four dynamics crucial 
to understanding the challenges of the Brahmaputra: international river 
governance norms, food security issues, water governance as an issue 
involving both international and domestic politics, and the key role that 
Tibet plays in Asia’s water challenges. Finally, the concluding section 
examines the extent to which a dispute over the river’s use represents a 
threat to India and explores India’s options as a downstream state. 
It is not clear what caused the sudden but temporary cessation 
of the Brahmaputra’s flow in March of 2012. What is clear, however, is 
that demand for the river’s water exceeds supply, and that the potential 
for conflict between the world’s two most populous countries over this 
finite resource is real. 
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II. Background 
 
A. Water Demand in India, China, and Bangladesh 
China is home to almost 20% of the world population, but only 
about 7% of water resources. The country faces water scarcity, and its 
water needs are further stressed by pollution. At present, China’s 
Ministry of Environmental Protection has deemed a quarter of China’s 
river water so dirty as to be unsuitable for drinking, agriculture, or even 
industrial use. Moreover, although China is almost entirely water 
independent—that is, almost all of the country’s renewable freshwater 
supply comes from rivers that originate within the country—the 
distribution of surface water is geographically uneven. The bulk of the 
country’s freshwater resources are located in the country’s south and 
southwest, which benefits that region’s farms and factories but leaves 
the wheat-producing heartland and industrial north dry. To address this 
imbalance, Beijing has undertaken an extraordinarily ambitious 
hydrological engineering plan called South to North Water Diversion. 
By 2050, China hopes to move 45 billion cubic meters of water per 
year through a series of tunnels, aqueducts, and canals. Engineers also 
seek to link the country’s four major waterways: the Huang He, 
Yangtze, Huai He, and Hai He. The water diversion plan includes three 
routes—eastern, central, and western—with a total estimated price tag 
of around US$62 billion. Water division plans on the Chinese portion 
of the Brahmaputra are crucial to the western route. 
India is home to about 17% of the world’s population but less 
than 4% of water resources, and the country is dependent on foreign-
originating rivers for about a third of its surface water. Water shortages 
will exact rising economic and social costs in the country as India’s 
population and water needs continue to grow. India’s freshwater supply 
is also significantly influenced by weather patterns, with the short 
monsoon season responsible for the lion’s share of the country’s annual 
precipitation. Approximately half of nationwide precipitation falls over 
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just 15 days, and 90 percent of river flows are concentrated in the 
wettest four months of the year.
5
  
Bangladesh is home to 2.15% of the world’s population, and 
merely .24% of water resources. The country is almost entirely 
dependent on cross-boundary water flows for its supply. For this reason, 
any upstream diversion of the Brahmaputra would likely be felt most 
keenly by Bangladesh. The Brahmaputra is among Bangladesh’s most 
important rivers, and diversion could mean environmental devastation 
for much of the low-income, densely populated country, as well as 
serious consequences for Bangladesh’s agriculture and fishing 
industries. In addition to being the most dependent on externally 
sourced water, Bangladesh is the poorest of the three countries in 
question, as well as the most densely populated, leaving it with fewer 
resources and fewer options to respond to challenges created by water 
diversions. 
 
Figure 1: Total Available Renewable Water Resources
6
 
Country China India Bangladesh 
External Water 
Resources 
(million m
3
) 
17,169 647,220 1,105,644 
Total Water 
Resources 
(million m
3
) 
2,840,000 1,907,760 1,210,644 
External 
Dependency Ratio 
.9% 33.4% 91.3% 
 
 
 
                                                     
5
 World Bank, “India’s Water Economy: Bracing for a Turbulent Future,” 
December 22, 2005. 
6
 Source: United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, Aquastat online 
data 2011. 
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Figure 2: Dependency Ratio in Renewable Water
7
 
 
 
. 
 
 
B. Brahmaputra River: Course, Length, and Geography 
The Brahmaputra begins from its source in the Kailas range of 
the Himalayas and flows 2,300 miles before emptying into the Bay of 
Bengal in Bangladesh. Its course takes it through China, India, and 
Bangladesh, and its watershed also falls within parts of Nepal, Bhutan, 
and Burma. Reflecting the diversity of people and geography along its 
course, the river goes by many names, including the Yarlung Tsangpo 
(also spelled Zangbo) in Tibet, the Brahmaputra in India, and the 
Jamuna in Bangladesh. 
                                                     
7
 “The dependency ratio is a good indicator of where tension and conflict over 
water-sharing and use can occur. The map clearly depicts such areas including 
central Asia, the Middle East (especially Syria and Iraq), India and Pakistan, 
and surprisingly, low land countries such as the Netherlands.” United Nations 
Environment Programme, 2008, 
http://www.unep.org/dewa/vitalwater/article79.html. 
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Beginning in the Tibetan Plateau’s Angshi Glacier, the river 
flows eastward for nearly 700 miles between the main range of the 
Himalayas to its south and the Kailas Range to its north, gaining 
strength from tributaries along the way. The river’s journey through 
Tibet takes place at an average altitude of more than 12,000 feet, 
making it the world’s highest-flowing river system. 
After passing the city of Pei in Tibet, the river turns northeast 
and makes its so-called Great Bend in Tibet’s Nyangtri Prefecture. 
Here the river runs through narrow gorges in a series of rapids and 
cascades before turning south and southwest to flow through the Grand 
Canyon of the Tsangpo, the longest, steepest, and one of the deepest 
canyons on earth. The canyon’s overall average depth is about 7,440 
feet, and at its deepest reaches 19,714 feet, more than twice as deep as 
the Grand Canyon. During its journey through the canyon, the 
Brahmaputra has the largest slope deflection of any river surface in the 
world at 75.35 percent. The geology creates the potential for immense 
hydropower generation if the river is tamed. 
After leaving the Tibet Autonomous Region, the river then 
passes through the territory of Arunachal Pradesh, whose control 
remains disputed by China and India. This 56,000-square-mile area is 
currently controlled by India but was captured by China during their 
1962 border war. Although Beijing subsequently withdrew voluntarily 
to the current effective line of demarcation, it still refuses to recognize 
India’s control over the region. The resulting border conflict, along 
with similar conflicts over other disputed segments of the border, 
remains one of the most significant potential flashpoints affecting Sino-
Indian relations. 
The river next enters Assam state in northeastern India, where 
it is fed by other Himalayan tributaries to become the Brahmaputra. It 
is a powerful river even in the dry season, and during the rains its banks 
are more than six miles apart at points. 
The river runs for several hundred miles through India before 
crossing the border into Bangladesh, where it follows a 150-mile course 
as the Jamuna. It then joins with the Ganges, Hinduism’s holiest river, 
before emptying into the Bay of Bengal. 
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The Ganges-Brahmaputra is a huge river system, with more 
people living in its basin than in all of Western Europe and North 
America combined. The river system’s average discharge is the third 
largest in the world, behind only the Amazon and the Congo. At its 
terminus, more than 1,000,000 cubic feet per second of water flow into 
the ocean, approximately 700,000 of which are supplied by the 
Brahmaputra. 
 
C. Chinese Water Projects and the Brahmaputra 
As the upper riparian country, China is able to make decisions 
that directly affect the volume of water available to its downstream 
neighbors, and of the numerous rivers crossing from China into India 
and Bangladesh, the Brahmaputra is the most important. Its mean 
annual transboundary runoff volume (the average amount of the river 
flow that crosses international borders) almost equals the total cross-
border flows of all the other rivers directly flowing into India from 
Tibet, and is greater than the combined cross-border flows of the 
Mekong and the Salween, the two main Tibetan Plateau rivers flowing 
into Southeast Asia.
8
 
China is the world’s most aggressive dam builder, and Chinese 
water projects have already been accused of causing environmental 
damage and forced displacement of people in neighboring downstream 
countries. To the country’s southeast, for instance, although the 
governments of Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia have been 
reluctant to directly confront their larger neighbor over water use, 
tensions continue to rise as dams on the Chinese portion of the Mekong 
River are seen to disrupt river flows and cause environmental damage.
9
 
Although China’s leaders long denied having plans for major 
hydrological works along the Brahmaputra, studies and plans involving 
Brahmaputra hydro projects have been promulgated over the last 
several decades, and dam building has begun. 
                                                     
8
 Brahma Chellaney, “China’s New War Front,” Times of India, April 23, 
2013. 
9
 Michael Richardson, “Dams in China Turn the Mekong into a River of 
Discord,” Yale Global Online, July 16, 2009, 
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/dams-china-turn-mekong-river-discord. 
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In 2003, the Chinese state newspaper People’s Daily reported 
the initiation of a feasibility study to examine the possibility of 
undertaking a “major hydropower project” located at the 
Brahmaputra’s Great Bend. Eagerly anticipating the power to be 
generated, the report noted that the Tibetan portion of the river “boasts 
a water energy reserve of about 100 million kilowatts, or one-sixth of 
the country’s total, ranking second behind the Yangtze river, China’s 
longest.” 10  The study made public something long suspected: The 
Chinese government was fully aware of the river’s power-generation 
potential and was actively considering exploiting it. 
In 2006, the State Council, China’s 35-member cabinet, 
authorized detailed planning for the Tsangpo Project at the Great Bend. 
The full plan is reported to comprise two projects: the construction of a 
dam at the Great Bend more than twice the size of the Three Gorges 
Dam (currently the world’s largest as measured by installed generation 
capacity), and the diversion of the Brahmaputra’s course as part of the 
South-North Project’s Great Western Route. Particularly noteworthy 
were press reports reviving previous discussions about using nuclear 
detonations to blast a 10-mile-long tunnel through the Himalayas to 
reroute the river’s flow. The discussion of nuclear demolition has the 
potential to upend existing efforts to prevent the use of nuclear bombs 
in civil engineering, adding a nuclear nonproliferation challenge to an 
already thorny issue between neighbors. 
China’s interest in nuclear demolition along the Brahmaputra 
route is one reason that ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT), an international agreement not to detonate any nuclear 
devices, has been stalled since the late 1990s. Beijing’s desire to 
preserve the option of using nuclear detonations for hydrological 
engineering (sometimes referred to as peaceful nuclear explosions, or 
PNEs) has made China the only country to request that a PNE 
exception be added to the treaty’s language. This proposed PNE 
exception has the potential to further undermine the already weak 
nonproliferation regime in South Asia, since nonproliferation experts 
                                                     
10
 People’s Daily, “China to Conduct Feasibility Study on Power Project in 
Tibet,” July 17, 2003. 
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suggest that any detonation can offer data with military value.
11
 The 
issue remains a non-starter for negotiators from the United States and 
elsewhere. Nonetheless, the revival of the plans in 2005 and 2006 was 
greeted with excitement by hydrological engineers in China. A 
hydrologist at the Chinese Academy of Sciences said in a media 
interview: “Now the Western Route isn’t just an abstract plan; it will go 
ahead.”12 
In April 2010, during a visit by Indian Foreign Minister S.M. 
Krishna to Beijing, a Chinese official first identified by name the site 
on the Brahmaputra where initial dam construction would take place: 
Zangmu, in Tibet. Chinese officials assured India that the projects 
would be run-of-the-river and would create no water shortages 
downstream. (The term “run-of-the-river” is used to describe 
hydroelectric power plants that incorporate little or no storage of 
dammed water, leaving them subject to seasonal water flows and 
unable to regulate generation in response to peak power.) In response to 
India’s subsequent requests for additional information about the plans, 
China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said, “China adopts a 
responsible attitude towards the development of cross border water 
resources. We adopt a policy that protection goes together with 
development, and take into full consideration the interests of 
downstream countries.”13  
Further information about the dam building plan was released 
as part of China’s current five-year energy plan, promulgated in 
January 2013. The plan includes proposals for three medium-sized 
dams on the Yarlung Zangbo. In a move that raised tension between the 
two countries, India was not consulted prior to the release of the plan 
and only learned about the projects from the Chinese press. This led the 
Indian government to protest strongly, reminding Beijing that India 
                                                     
11
 John Horgan, “‘Peaceful’ Nuclear Explosions,” Scientific American, June 
1996, p. 14. 
12
 “China Taps Tibetan Waters,” International Herald Tribune, August 1, 2006. 
13
 “Will Adopt ‘Reasonable’ Attitude on Cross-Border River Issues: China,” 
Economic Times, June 14, 2011, 
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-06-
14/news/29657046_1_brahmaputra-yarlung-tsangpo-dam 
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remains “a lower riparian State with considerable established user 
rights to the waters of the river.”14 
At present, the issue remains at the top of India’s bilateral 
agenda with China. In March 2013, at the first meeting between Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh and China’s new leader Xi Jinping, which 
took place on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit, Prime Minister 
Singh proposed the creation of a joint mechanism to study Chinese 
activity on the Brahmaputra. He spoke to the Indian media about the 
conversation: “I also took the opportunity to raise the issue of trans-
border river systems and I requested the Chinese Government to 
provide a joint mechanism to enable us to assess the type of 
construction activity that is going on in the Tibetan Autonomous 
Region. The President of China assured me that they were quite 
conscious of their responsibilities and the interest of the lower riparian 
countries. As regards the specific mechanism that I had suggested, he 
said that they would have it further looked into.” 15  The following 
month, China rejected out of hand the creation of a new water 
negotiation mechanism with India.
16
 
In assessing his meeting with President Xi, Prime Minister 
Singh expressed sanguine confidence regarding China’s intentions: “As 
of now, our assessment is that whatever activity are taking place on the 
Bramhamputra region in Tibet, they are essentially the run-of-the-river 
projects and therefore there is no cause for worry on our part.”17 The 
Prime Minister’s confidence notwithstanding, the pattern of China’s 
                                                     
14
 “Downstream States’ Interests Shouldn’t Be Harmed: India to China,” 
Indian Express, February 1, 2013, 
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/downstream-states—interests-shouldn-t-
be-harmed-india-to-china/1067777/ 
15
 Prime Minister of India, “Onboard Media Interaction with PM on Return 
from BRICS Summit,” press release, March 28, 2013, 
http://pmindia.gov.in/press-details.php?nodeid=1587 
16
 “China Spikes India’s Proposal for Joint Mechanism on Brahmaputra,” 
Hindu, April 17, 2013. 
17
 Prime Minister of India, “Onboard Media Interaction with PM on Return 
from BRICS Summit,” press release, March 28, 2013, 
http://pmindia.gov.in/press-details.php?nodeid=1587. 
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dam construction to date suggests that its downstream neighbors may 
have cause for concern. 
China has already established a template for dam construction 
on both cross-border and domestic rivers. The country has historically 
begun with small, upstream dams before moving on to larger 
construction projects further downstream, culminating in massive 
engineering works such as the Three Gorges Dam. Indian water 
security expert Brahma Chellaney spoke with the Washington Post 
about this dynamic after the 2013 Five Year Plan was released:
18
 
From the Yangtze to the Mekong and now the 
Brahmaputra, Chinese dam building follows a well-
established pattern. ... There are 12 small dams on the 
Brahmaputra’s upper reaches and tributaries and one 
medium-size dam under construction on the river ... the 
next step will be larger dams in spots where the river 
picks up huge amounts of water and momentum nearer 
the Indian border. Those dams could not only affect 
water flows but also remove nutrient-rich silt that helps 
nourish agriculture downstream. 
The overall effects of large-scale dam construction are well 
understood. They include decreased volume of water available for 
downstream use; disruption of natural flooding cycles; the holding back 
of nutrient-rich sediment; and changes to riparian, marine, and fishery 
ecology and economy. In future years, climate change may well 
exacerbate these effects, particularly in glacier-fed rivers like the 
Brahmaputra. Higher temperatures are likely to increase the rate at 
which glaciers melt, leading to increased river flows in the short run but 
decreases long-term. If China moves ahead with its dam building, the 
result will be control by Beijing over an ever larger percentage of a 
constantly shrinking river. It is this possibility that suggests why 
Beijing and New Delhi may be on a collision course over the 
Brahmaputra. 
                                                     
18
 Simon Denyer, “Chinese Dams in Tibet Raise Hackles in India,” 
Washington Post, February 7, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-
02-07/world/36967163_1_development-of-cross-border-rivers-lower-and-
upper-stream-chinese-dams. 
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III. Dynamics of Interstate Water Conflicts: The 
Brahmaputra and Beyond 
 
China’s commitment to construct ever-larger upriver dams 
reflects a zero-sum mentality on water use that has the potential to 
bring it directly into conflict with India. Farther downstream, the 
actions of both countries affect Bangladesh. Whether this conflict 
escalates beyond diplomacy to an actual water war is impossible to 
predict at this stage. Yet in spite of, or perhaps because of, the 
uncertainty, the Brahmaputra case study is a useful tool for identifying 
some salient features of cross-border water conflicts, as well as 
exploring the Sino-Indian context and the issues particular to this river. 
 
A. International River Governance 
Understanding water in a strategic context depends first on 
understanding the norms and realities of international river use and 
governance. The right to use the water of a border-crossing river 
involves a combination of de facto and de jure control—control in fact 
and control in law. Fortunately for China, and unfortunately for its 
neighbors, China has a strong hand by both measures. 
From a realpolitik perspective, the most important control is de 
facto, which depends entirely on geography. Simply put, it is better to 
be upstream than downstream. Here, China is in the driver’s seat. By 
controlling Tibet, China controls the Brahmaputra, along with the 
source of the other major Himalayan-origin river systems (this dynamic 
is explored further below, in the section on Tibet). Suffice it to say that, 
as long as Tibet remains a part of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC), China’s regional hydrological hegemony is assured. 
But even if possession is, as the saying goes, nine-tenths of the 
law, international water law still has a role to play. The Helsinki Rules 
on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, adopted in 1966, set 
forth the basic principle that countries are allowed to use the water that 
flows within their borders. Further rules were codified in the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
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Watercourses, which was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 
1997 but has yet to go into force. (China is neither a party nor a 
signatory to this treaty.) Overall, customary international water law sets 
forth an allowable water usage framework, taking into effect multiple 
factors including historic use, volume of water contributed by each 
country’s territorial rivers, population size, and future needs. Of 
particular significance here is the legal preference given to the first 
state to “use” water by building dams, diversion projects, irrigation, or 
other engineered works. De jure control over a river is enhanced by 
investments in dams or other construction. Through its expanding dam-
building campaign on the Brahmaputra, China seems increasingly 
likely to obtain strong de jure standing to accompany its de facto 
control. 
As noted, it is better for practical reasons to have the water first 
and for legal reasons to use it first, and China does both, but Beijing 
has chosen to further maximize its maneuver room by refusing to enter 
into formal water-sharing agreements with any of its neighbors. Indeed, 
when China announced its dam building plans for the Brahmaputra in 
2010, it also stated that, since it was not party to any water-sharing 
treaties with India, it was under no formal obligation to share any 
information on its dam construction plans whatsoever, but that it 
choose to do so magnanimously, “out of a sense of trust.”19 Officials in 
India and elsewhere have repeatedly expressed frustration over China’s 
refusal to provide the planning data needed to enable effective 
monitoring of construction and its impacts, but China has thus far 
turned a deaf ear to these protestations. And as long as Beijing has 
signed no treaties or agreements pledging to do otherwise, New Delhi 
is left without an international legal body with jurisdiction to hear its 
appeals. 
Indian strategists have been particularly frustrated by New 
Delhi’s failure to reach binding water agreements with China because 
India in 1960 voluntarily entered into a water treaty with its 
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downstream neighbor and perpetual rival Pakistan. According to the 
provisions of the Indus Waters Treaty, India sets aside 80 percent of the 
waters of the Indus River system for Pakistani use. Furthermore, in 
1996 India entered into the Ganges Treaty with Bangladesh. This treaty 
guarantees a minimum level of cross-border flows into Bangladesh and 
divides the Ganges’ waters almost equally between the two countries. 
Critics of the Indian government’s handling of water issues ask why 
New Delhi has voluntarily shown what they see as generosity toward 
the country’s downstream partners without finding a way to obtain 
similarly open-handed promises from its upstream neighbor, China.
20
 
As such, although international river law has room to grow in 
scope and importance, the problem facing the Brahmaputra basin is not 
that there exists no precedent for negotiating equitable water-sharing 
solutions. India’s own treaties with Bangladesh and Pakistan could 
serve as at least one reference point, as could any number of the more 
than 400 other freshwater-sharing agreements and treaties inked since 
the nineteenth century.
21
 Instead, for believers in the power of bilateral 
or multilateral institutions to mitigate conflict, the inconvenient truth is 
that participation in water-sharing agreements remains optional. China 
refuses to opt in, and India has not yet shown itself able to coax or 
force China to the table and extract binding, enforceable concessions. 
Beijing’s recalcitrance on this point is one of many impediments to the 
construction of a rules- and norms-based international relations system 
in the region. Until such a system is put in place, China will be free to 
proceed with dam building as it sees fit, unfettered by treaty or 
international law. 
 
B. Food Security: Food Imports as “Virtual Water”  
Although raw materials like minerals, timber, and oil obviously 
differ from one another, they are each fungible, internationally traded 
commodities; in other words, oil or timber or minerals from one part of 
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the world can largely be substituted for similar quantities of the same 
material from elsewhere. As a result, they behave similarly on 
international markets. Water is different. As a resource for which there 
is functionally no international marketplace—at least until demand 
becomes sufficiently acute to create such a market—and for which 
access is determined primarily by geography, water as a strategic 
commodity is unique. 
Because there is no major world market for trading water itself, 
to understand how water moves around the globe today it is necessary 
to look at trade in other goods, introducing the concept of virtual water. 
All finished products require water to greater or lesser degrees for their 
production. Therefore, importing intermediate or finished products is 
an indirect way of importing the embedded water required to grow or 
make them. In China and India, where agriculture currently accounts 
for 70 percent and more than 50 percent, respectively, of water 
consumption, the most significant tradable commodities from a water 
perspective are foodstuffs.
22
 
At present, both China and India are net exporters of food. 
According to Brahma Chellaney, “China and India together account 
for … 52.8 percent of the world’s rice production, 30.1 percent of the 
wheat, 21 percent of the corn, and 28.5 percent of the total grain.”23 As 
China and India continue to grow, and as they grow wealthier and the 
inputs to their citizens’ diets move further up the value chain, they are 
likely to cross the threshold to become net food importers. Water 
scarcity will increase the prospect of this transition taking place and 
force one or both of these countries to seek additional imports from the 
water-rich countries better able to provide the embedded water that 
goes into growing surplus food. This requirement, anathema to planners 
seeking domestic food security, will add yet another dimension to 
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China and India’s already complicated strategic calculus vis-à-vis 
commodity demands. 
The concept of water scarcity leading to food insecurity is one 
of the thorniest issues in most cross-border water disputes, and the 
conflict over the Brahmaputra is no exception. China’s ability to 
control the river’s flow through damming and diversion could 
potentially give Beijing the ability to choke off the food supply to its 
largest neighbor. It has been likened to the ability to lay siege to an 
enemy’s castle without ever having to cross one’s own border. 
Moreover, unlike some other sources of power in international 
diplomacy, the threat of water diversion is not “use it or lose it.” Once 
the dams have been built, the ability to create suffering at the human 
level in India and Bangladesh through induced water and food 
shortages will stand implicitly behind any request coming from Beijing. 
The implications are not lost on New Delhi. For India, even the 
intimation of such a threat in the context of the Brahmaputra could be a 
nearly existential hazard. It is not difficult to imagine Indian military 
planners preparing for such an eventuality by exploring options to 
destroy or otherwise neutralize the offending dams. The result is that 
the food security issues that accompany dam building give birth to a 
flashpoint and source of tension that, once created, will be difficult to 
undo. This makes food security one of the drivers most likely to spur 
New Delhi into action over Beijing’s moves on the river. 
 
C. Water Governance Is Simultaneously International and 
Domestic 
Along cross-border rivers, water consumption choices made by 
the upper riparian state affect the downriver state. However, actual 
water consumption decisions are generally made either at the local 
level, or by central government planners who have local consumption 
in mind. (This is even true of China’s giant water diversion projects, 
which are meant to provide water for local use in regions currently 
suffering from scarcity.) For this reason, domestic politics can play an 
equal or greater role than international relations when it comes to how 
water resources are actually used. 
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In China, the state-planned economic model in place since 
1949 is overlaid atop a historical imperative dating back to imperial 
times to control the country’s flood-prone rivers. The result has been a 
“campaign” mentality focusing on huge capital investments in large-
scale hydro projects. Rather than making hard choices about allocating 
limited local water resources—or devolving authority to the local level 
to make those decisions—Beijing has promulgated large, capital-
intensive solutions such as the South-to-North Water Diversion Project. 
The individual components that make up the South-to-North 
Water Diversion Project range in size, but China has already 
demonstrated its comfort level with giant dams such as the Three 
Gorges. Mega hydro projects such as these take an extraordinary toll on 
local residents. The Three Gorges Dam flooded important cultural and 
archeological sites, affected local and downstream ecology, and forced 
the relocation of 1.3 million people. Many within China and abroad 
objected to the dam, and its construction was not without protests and 
opposition, but there is little that local residents in China can do to 
block a project of this kind from going forward once the decision has 
been made in Beijing. This is even more true in the ethnic minority 
region of Tibet than elsewhere in China. Any organized protest or 
opposition to a significant dam project by Tibetans would almost 
certainly elicit a swift and thorough government crackdown. For this 
reason, although India might hope to ally itself with locals in 
opposition to the construction of dams, China’s dam-building history 
offers minimal hope that this would be an effective tactic. 
India faces its own challenging domestic dynamic around the 
subject of dam building. The country’s robust democracy allows local 
Indian interest groups to block large projects they oppose much more 
effectively than is possible in China. Even more significant is that India 
has not dedicated nearly the same capital resources China has to 
hydrological infrastructure. Where China has built more than 25,800 
large dams, India has constructed 4,300.
24
 On the Brahmaputra, 
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although India has expressed a desire to complete more water works, 
the country has been unable thus far to successfully undertake major 
damming or river improvement projects. While this represents a good-
news story to ecological groups that oppose large-scale Indian hydro 
works, it does little to help India stake a legal claim to river usage or to 
allow it to generate power or regulate river flows. It remains to be seen 
whether major Indian Brahmaputra projects will succeed in the future, 
but as long as the river’s source in Tibet is under Chinese control and 
local Tibetan opposition to dam projects remains weak, the most 
significant investments in damming and changing the water’s flow will 
remain on the Chinese side of the border. 
 
 
D. Tibet as a Water Issue 
China is the source of cross-border river flows to more other 
countries than anywhere else, but thinking of the source of these major 
rivers as “China” ignores the reality that all of the important rivers 
crossing into other countries originate in Chinese minority regions. The 
huge glaciers and high altitude of the Himalayas make this region the 
source of most of Asia’s great river systems, including the Brahmaputra, 
the Indus, the Sutlej, the Salween, and the Mekong. These rivers pass 
through 11 countries and nourish about 2 billion people, but they all 
originate in Tibet. This makes the Tibetan Plateau the spigot of Asia, 
and it is Beijing’s hand on the tap. 
For U.S. policy makers, the significance of the Tibet issue 
centers on rights for Tibetans. The historical reasons for this include 
concern for the unjust treatment Tibet has faced, charismatic leadership 
from the Dalai Lama, and effective lobbying in Washington. Tibet has 
long been a cause célèbre in Washington, and has created unusual 
political bedfellows by uniting Democrats and Republicans eager to 
take a stand against China. 
For Beijing, however, keeping Tibet a part of China goes 
beyond the already important strategic objective of maintaining the 
PRC’s territorial integrity. Tibet is the hydrological lynchpin of the 
region. Control of the Tibetan Plateau allows China to remain a water-
independent country whose major rivers all originate within its own 
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borders, and allows it to exercise hegemonic hydrological leverage over 
its neighbors, including India, its only potential peer competitor in the 
region. And the future construction of ever-larger dams on those rivers 
will offer China the capability to choke off those neighbors’ freshwater 
supplies or threaten to do so. 
Any understanding of Tibet’s importance to China must 
include an understanding of the related water issues. It also presents 
India a potential option for leverage. Since fleeing China in 1959, the 
Dalai Lama has made his home and government-in-exile in Dharamsala, 
India. India’s relationship with China’s Tibetan population remains 
strong as a result. India has long acceded to China’s control over Tibet, 
but should New Delhi decide it is worth incurring the wrath of Beijing 
to press for greater water usage rights, the issue of Beijing’s treatment 
of Tibet and relationship with the Dalai Lama presents one possible 
avenue to pursue. It is a potentially risky move in that it would 
certainly be met with opposition from China in the strongest possible 
terms. However, if the PRC continues with aggressive dam building 
and access to water becomes an existential concern for India, the status 
of Tibet may become a more important factor in Sino-Indian relations. 
 
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
In looking at the issues presented by the dispute over use of the 
Brahmaputra, the first question we must ask is, how much does this 
actually matter? Is this a clear and present danger to India, or simply 
one of many friction points in a challenging bilateral relationship? Will 
use of the Brahmaputra’s water push India and China over the line and 
provoke a border skirmish or all-out war, or is it an irritating but 
tolerable fact of life? 
The ways that China goes about its dam building clearly matter 
a great deal in determining how dire a situation India faces. On the one 
hand, if Beijing holds true to its word that all Brahmaputra projects are 
to be small and run-of-the-river, India will have little to fear. On the 
CHRISTOPHER: WATER WARS 
 
30 
 
other hand, as the old saying goes, hope is not a strategy, and Beijing 
has a track record of insisting that all will be well and then turning 
around and unveiling a less attractive alternative scenario already under 
development as a fait accompli. 
How much of a threat China’s actions poses to India is a 
question that only New Delhi can answer, but if history is any guide, 
China can be expected to press ahead with increasingly larger dam 
projects. It remains to be seen whether Prime Minister Singh’s recently 
expressed confidence in China’s intentions represents a widely held 
consensus among members of the Indian government or simply rhetoric 
designed to mollify China without diminishing India’s already limited 
options. India’s downstream status means that it starts out somewhat at 
China’s mercy. It has been dealt a weak hand geographically, and the 
cards it has, it has not played well. New Delhi has failed to negotiate 
aggressively with Beijing for greater water rights and has willingly 
conceded that Tibet is part of the PRC. These accommodationist 
tendencies have likely helped to smooth tensions and improve relations 
with China, but if the price eventually proves to be forfeiture of India’s 
hydrological independence, the relationship will have been dearly 
bought. 
If, then, India determines at some point that dams and water 
diversions on the Chinese-controlled portion of the Brahmaputra do 
present a threat, the question becomes: what instruments of national 
power does India have at its disposal to stop construction or mitigate 
the consequences? To be clear, this question is not meant to be an 
alarmist suggestion that a Sino-Indian water war is imminent. As Dr. 
Jabin Jacob of the Institute for Chinese Studies in New Delhi accurately 
notes, “China and India see themselves as responsible regional and 
global powers, and a war of any kind between them will not only set 
back bilateral relations but also damage their reputations internationally. 
At the moment, this is not a cost that either side is willing to pay.”25 
Nonetheless, it is worth exploring what options India could choose to 
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pursue should it determine in the future that it needs to act more 
assertively on the subject of the Brahmaputra. 
The panoply of possible responses encompasses all the 
implements in the international relations toolbox, including diplomacy, 
international law, economic pressure, covert action, and ultimately 
military force. In the event that India decides to take up the issue more 
stridently, continued diplomacy will be the first response. 
Unfortunately, in the search for effective water conflict resolution 
mechanisms, the history of Sino-Indian relations does not offer much 
cause optimism. The countries’ three post-independence border 
conflicts—the 1962 Sino-Indian War, the 1967 Chola Incident, and the 
1987 Sino-Indian Skirmish—have left a legacy of mistrust. China and 
India have still not reached an agreement on the mutually disputed 
territories of Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin, both sides of the 
border are militarized, and India continues to be leery of China’s close 
ties with Pakistan. Confidence-building visits and statements by senior 
leaders have helped to warm relations in recent years, but the two 
countries have neither a historical reservoir of trust nor a shared 
framework for addressing water issues. For these reasons, if the Indian 
government decides that China’s water usage presents a threat that 
must be tackled more forcefully, the diplomatic structures in place 
today may not be equal to the task of addressing the issue. 
To yield results on an issue of such importance to Beijing, any 
diplomatic approach by New Delhi will have to be backed with weighty 
sticks and/or juicy carrots. Appeal to an international legal body or 
intergovernmental organization such as the United Nations will remain 
a fruitless exercise as long as China refuses to enter into water-sharing 
agreements. India would gain much by inducing China to constrain its 
actions and voluntarily enter into a water-sharing agreement, but only a 
strong inducement could yield this result. As long as bilateral trade 
remains heavily weighted in China’s favor, economic incentives lack 
the necessary punch. Indian pushback against China’s control over 
Tibet could serve as one possible stick but, as mentioned above, this is 
a card that must be played delicately due to Beijing’s extreme 
sensitivity to this issue. India could offer support to China on issues of 
shared concern, but for this carrot to be worth China’s while, the issues 
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would have to be significant indeed. It is difficult to imagine a 
sufficiently important issue on which India could align with China 
without also putting itself crossways with the United States or upsetting 
China’s relationship with its longtime partner Pakistan, or both. 
If diplomatic and economic inducements fail but the issue is 
still deemed a major threat, Indian planners may feel forced to explore 
more aggressive options. Covert campaigns to induce Tibetan 
opposition to dam building might play to India’s strengths in terms of 
the country’s support of the Dalai Lama and ties to ethnic Tibetans, but 
there is no certainty that the Dalai Lama or any organized group of 
Tibetans would support such an effort (in fact, the Dalai Lama’s recent 
positions on Tibet suggest it is unlikely). Moreover, even the most 
successful campaign of this kind would risk infuriating Beijing without 
doing more than temporarily halting or slowing dam construction. The 
risk-reward tradeoff that would be involved if India took direct action 
against a dam would be even more stark. Sabotage, whether via 
computer virus or a traditional kinetic operation, has the real potential 
to be viewed as an act of war. Only if India deems Chinese dam 
construction to be an equally aggressive act would such a course of 
action be warranted. And an outright military strike against a 
neighboring country’s dam is so clearly a declaration of war as to be 
conceivable only in the most dire of circumstances. 
In any examination of India’s potential options, timing plays a 
crucial role. The key dimension is that this issue presents India with a 
steadily closing window. The earlier India pushes back against Chinese 
dam building, the more options will be available to it. The longer it 
waits, the more it will face a choice between accepting China’s actions 
or taking dire measures. At the end, this is probably the most broadly 
generalizable insight that can be drawn from study of the Brahmaputra 
issue. In riparian relations, delay favors the upstream state. A 
downstream state—in this case India—is far more able to influence the 
eventual outcome and reach a diplomatically negotiated fair use plan by 
intervening early. Its negotiating position is strongest before or during 
the planning stages of dam construction. Once building commences, a 
downstream state’s options shrink. And after the offending dams and 
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water diversions are complete and operational, a downstream state’s 
means of seeking redress are few indeed. 
Here, we return to the plight of Bangladesh. Smallest, poorest, 
most heavily dependent on foreign-originated water, and weakest 
militarily and diplomatically of the three Brahmaputra countries, it has 
still managed to negotiate more effectively with its upper riparian 
neighbor India than India has with China. Bangladesh took to heart the 
need to cut the most advantageous deal possible for itself before dams 
were built and water became scarce. Unfortunately for Bangladesh, 
even if India upholds its obligations under the Ganges Treaty, there is 
no escaping the river’s geography, and the destiny of the Brahmaputra 
will be written farther upstream. For this reason, the best possible 
course of action for decision makers in Dhaka is to do what they can to 
induce China to share the river equitably, and to join with their 
counterparts in Delhi to negotiate for the same. 
The Brahmaputra is not the world’s largest river, but its waters 
are shared by the two most populous countries, so what happens there 
matters a great deal. Management of the river touches on a host of 
crucial and complicated issues, including territorial integrity, food 
security, international law, the intersection of domestic and foreign 
policy, and the asymmetric power of neighboring states with huge 
populations and great aspirations. The way that the river dispute is 
managed—or mismanaged—will tell us much about the direction of 
Sino-Indian relations, and about whether water wars will emerge as one 
of the major international relations challenges of the twenty-first 
century. 
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